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July 17,  1982 I.  INTRODUCTION 
The  Commission  of  the European  Communities  is 
extremely  concerned  about  certain aspects  of  the united 
States Department  of  Commerce  (DOC)  preliminary 
determinations  in  the  countervailing  duty  investigations 
of  Certain Steel Products  from  Belgium,  France-;  the 
Federal  Republic  of Germany,  Luxembourg,  the Netherlands 
and  the  United  Kingdom.  Pursuant  to  section  3~.34(a) of 
the  DOC  regulations  (19  C.F.R.  §  355.34(a)  (1982))  and  the 
-
specific  instructions  contained  iri  the  preliminary 
determinations  published  in  the  Federal Register  on June 
17,  1982,  (47  Fed.  Reg.  26300  et ~· (1982))  the 
Commission  is filing  these  written views  on  the 
preliminary determinations  with  the  DOC. 
The  Commission  notes  that it has  also  expressed 
many  of its concerns  about  the  DOC  Rreliminary 
determinations  during  a ·special  discussion  in  a  meeting  of 
the General  Agreeme.nt  on Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT) 
~  . 
Committee  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures  on July 
15,  1982,  in Geneva,  Switzerland.  The  Commission  is 
submitting  to  the  DOC  the  memoranda  which  it has  supplied 
to  the  GATT  (Annexes  A and  B)  to  be  included  in  the  record 
of  these  investigations. 
In  submitting  this document  containing  the  GATT 
memoranda  and  additional  views  on  the  preliminary 
determinations,  the  Commission  is  acting  on  behalf  of  the - 2  -
Community,  which  is a  signatory  to  the  Agreement  on 
Interpretation and  Application of Articles VI,  XVI,  and 
XXIII  of  the  GATT  (Subsidies  Code).  Because  the  United 
States Government  (USG)  is also  a  signatory to GATT  and 
the  Code,  it is obliged  to  adhere  to  the  requircements.of 
those  instruments  as  a  matter of  international law. 
The  Commission  arguments  relating  to the GATT 
and  the  Code  are  legally relevant  to  USG  interpretation of 
-
its countervailing  statute  in Title VII  of  the Tariff  Act 
of  1930.  The  United  States  legislation  which  enacted 
Title VII,  the  Trade  Agreements  Act  of  1979  (TAA),  states 
· explicitly that  it is  intended  to  implement  the Subsidies 
Code  and  other  trade  agreements  negotiated  under  the  Trade 
Act  of  1974  (Section  1(c)(1)  of  the  TAA~  19  u.s.c.  §  2502) 
and  explicitly approves  the  Code  (Se~tion 2(a),  (c)  of  the 
TAA~  19  u.s.c.  §  2503).  ·Therefore,  as  a  matter of 
international  la~ and  of  domestic  law,  i~ is quite  clear 
that  the  DOC  is obliged  to  consider  the  ~bligations of  the 
USG  under  the GATT  and  the Subsidies  Code  when  it 
interprets  the u.s.  countervailing  duty  statute. 
Furthermore,  the  wording  of  the u.s.  countervailing  duty 
statute  is such  that  DOC  may  administer  that  law  in  a 
manner  which  is  consistent with  the  GATT  and  with  the  Code 
which  the  Congress  explicitly approved  and  implemented  in 
Title VII.  DOC,  therefore,  is  not  compelled  in  its - 3  -
administrative  determinations  under  the  countervailing 
duty statute  to violate  the  international  obligations  of 
the  USG  by  the  narrowly  drawn  provisions  of  section 3(a) 
of  the  TAA  (19  U.S.C.  S 2504). 
II.  THE  DOC  PRELIMINARY  DETERMINATIONS  ON  EUROPEAN 
COAL  AND  STEEL  COMMUNITY  (ECSC)  LOANS  ARE  BASED  ON 
ERRONEOUS  ASSUMPTIONS. 
In Appendix  C to  its notice  of  a  preliminary 
determination  relating  to  certain steel  products  imported 
from  Belgium,  published  in  the  Federal Register  on  June 
17,  1982,  (47  Fed.  Reg.  26300,  26309  (1982))  DOC 
erroneously stated  that: 
With  respect  to  ECSC  borrowing,  the  ECSC 
enjoys  a  very  high  credit  rating  because  of  its 
quasi-governmental  nature.  It is  therefore  able 
to raise  funds  at  interest  rates lower  than 
those  which  would  be  avail?ble  to European  steel 
companies.  (46  Fed.  Reg. ·26309  (1982)). 
Based  on  these  erron~ous assumptions,  th~ DOC  prelimin-
arily determined  that ECSC  loans  are  cou~tervailable 
insofar as  they offer preferential- interest rates  to steel 
companies. 1 
1  As  discussed  in Annex  A,  pages  18-19,  Annex  B, 
page  3,  and  Legal  Arguments  of  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities,  pages  14-16,  submitted  to  DOC  on  May 
17,  1982,  the  DOC  criteria for  determining  the  benefit  to 
a  company  which  borrows  from  the  ECSC  are  a  clear 
violation of  the  Subsidies  Code  loan  and  loan  guarantee 
requirements  and,  therefore,  are  not  proper  criteria under 
section  771(5)(B)  (19  u.s.c.  S  1677).  · - 4  -
A.  The  Basis  for  the  ECSC  Credit Rating 
is the  Levy 
The  credit rating  of  the  ECSC,  which  is not 
higher  than  the  credit  rating  of  a  number  of  European 
steel  companies,  is not  based  on  the  "quasi-governmental 
nature"  of  the  ECSC.  In  all  its steel  industry  related 
activities  involving  receipt  and  disbursement  of  monies,  -. 
the  ECSC  operates  on  a  commercial  basis  as  the  agent  for. 
European  steel  companies  producing  ECSC  products.  The 
ECSC,  unlike  the  European  Economic  Community  and  the 
European  Atomic  Energy  Community,  has  no  legal  power  to 
require  Member  State governments  to  supply  funds  for  ECSC 
programs.  The  ECSC  has  only  one  regular  source  of  funds, 
i.e., con·tributions  from  European  steel  companies  through 
the  levy.  Historically,  all other  ECSC  funds  are directly 
attributable to  the  use  of  levy  funds.2_ 
In  the  first  few  years  of  its existence,  the 
ECSC  was  unable  to  borrow money  on  world  capital  markets 
.  ~ 
precisely because  it did  not  have  the  financial  powers  of 
a  government  or even  a  "quasi-government"  to  assure 
2  Since  1978,  the  ECSC  has  received  relatively 
small  (~,  4%  of  total  revenue  in  1980)  contributions 
from'Member State governments  to  make  up  deficits  in  the 
operating  budgets.  These  contributions  are  specifically 
allocated  to  non-repayable  rehabilitation aids  to  Member 
State governments  for  resettlement  of  unemployed  steel 
workers  and  steel workers  adjustment  assistance.  (See 
EC  Questionnaire  Response  at  10,  29.)  ---- 5  -
repayment  of  loans.  On  the  advice  of  its American 
bankers,  the  ECSC  overcame  this  problem  by  demonstrating 
that it did,  in  fact,  represent  a  cooperative  financial 
endeavor of  the  European  steel  industry. 
This  was.done  by  accumulation  of  a  1~0 million 
ECU  ECSC  reserve  fund  over  three.years.  All  of, the  monies 
allocated  to this  fund  came  from  the  steel  ind~stry levy 
contributions.  The  ECSC  credit rating  on  world  capital 
-
markets  was  established,  and  continues  today,  because  of 
the  existence of  the  levy reserve  fund  and  the  fact  that 
the  ECSC  has  demonstrated,  through  accumulation  of  the 
fund  from  the  levy,  that it does  represent  the  financial 
resources  of  the  European  steel  industry. 
B.  ECSC  Pro~rams Based  on  the  Levy  are 
Not  Subs1dies 
Clearly,  D~C's assumption  that  the  basis  for  the 
ECSC's  credit rating  is its "guasi-governmental  nature"  is 
wrong.  That  credit rating  is based  directly on  the 
existence of  the  levy contributions  of  the  European  steel 
industry.  To  the  extent  that  some  steel  companies  may 
borrow  from  the  ECSC  at  a  rate of  interest  which  may  be 
less·than DOC's  totally arbitrary benchmark  rate,  or  even 
the  rate  actually available  to  the  companies  in  their 
individual  capacity,  there  is,  under  the  Subsidies  Code - 6  -
criteria  (See  Annex  A at  Si  EC  Legal  Arguments 
at 7-9),  no  consequential  adverse  affect on  conditions  of 
normal  competition,3 i.e.,  under  current  DOC  practice, 
no  countervailable  benefit  for  that  company. 
This  is because  the  ECSC  credit ratios  is  b~sed 
solely on  the  levy.  Therefore,  there  can  be  nQ,ECSC  loan 
program without  the  levy.  In  those  instances  in which  an 
ECSC  loan  rate  is less  than  the  rate  otherwise  actually 
available  to  a  company  in its individual  capacity,  the 
difference  in  interest rates  is  nothing  more  than  a 
partial return  to  companies  of  resources  they  have 
contributed  to  the  ECSC. 
It is  important  to  note  the  obvious  fact  that, 
under  section  303  of  the Tariff  Act  of  1930  (19  u.s.c.  § 
1303),  not  all foreign  practices  relating  to  an  industry  --
are  bounties  or grants •. -Zenith  Radio  Corp.  v.  United 
States,  437  u.s. _443,  455.:.457;  (1978):  See  United  States v. 
Hammond  Lead  Products,  Inc.,  440  F.2d  1024,  1030-1031 
(C.C.P.A.,  cert.  denied,  404  U.S.  1001  (1971);  Cf.  ASG 
Industries,  Inc.  v.  United States,  610  F.2d  770,  778 
(C.C.P.A.)  (1979).  Although  administrative practice or 
3  If the  DOC  applies  the  proper  specific criteria 
for  loans  under  the  Subsidies  Code  and  Title VII  (see 
footnote  1  supra),  the  g~neral criteria for  ---
countervailable  domestic  subsidies  under  the  Code  and, 
therefore,  under Title VIII  (i.e.,  adver~e affect  on 
conditions of  normal  competit1on),  need  not  be  reached. - 7  -
judicial  interpretation of  the  term  "bounty or grant"  in 
section 303  which  is "inconsistent"  with  the 
countervailing  duty  statute,  particularly section  771(5) 
of  the Tariff Act  of  1930,  as  enacted  in  the  TAA,  is not 
relevant  to  these  investigations  (S.  Rep.  No.  2~9,  96th 
Cong.,  1st Sess.  84  (1979)),  it is quite  clear Congress 
intended  this aspect  of  prior  interpretation to-continue 
under Title VII  (S.  Rep.  No.  249,  96th Cong.,  1st Sess. 
-
84-85  (1979)~  H.  Rep.  No.  317,  96th  Cong.,  1st Sess.  74 
(1979)).  Any  other  approach  would  be  absurd. 
The  fact  that  a  practice exists  cannot  mean  that 
practice is  a  "subsidy"  within  the  meaning  of section 
771(5)  of  the Tariff Act  of  1930.  The,threshold 
determination that  DOC  must  make  in  any  investigation of  a 
practice  under  the  countervailing  du~y statute  in Title 
VII  is whether  that  progtam  is  a  "subsidy."  Because  the 
term  "subsidy"  is not  defined genericaliy in  the GATT,  the 
~ 
Subsidies  Code,  or domestic  law,  DOC  must  consider  many 
factors  when  it applies  the  international  legal  criteria 
by  which  the  USG  is  bound  under  GATT  and  Subsidies  Code 
and  those  criteria as  implemented  in  domestic  law  under 
Title VII.  These  factors  include  the  precise  nature  and 
operation of  the  program,  the  "economic  effect of  the 
practice"  (Zenith,  437  u.s.  at  457),  and  the  "substantial - 8  -
reliance  interests"  arising  from  past  international  and 
USG  practice which  have  arisen over  the  years.  (Zenith, 
437  u.s.  at  458).4 
DOC  considered  these  complex  factors  and  proper-
ly applied  the  international  and,  therefore,  dQmestic. 
legal  criteria when  it determined  that  ECSC  programs  for 
steel  companies  which  exist solely by virtue  o~_levy 
contributions  from  those  companies,  and  are  nothing  more 
than  a  partial  return  to  companies  of  their own  funds,  are 
not  countervailable  benefits.  Quite  clearly,  the  nature 
of  the  relationship  between  the  levy  and  ECSC  borrowing 
and  lending  activities  requires  the  same  conclusion  with 
respect  to ECSC  loans  to steel  compan~es. 
4  The  Senate Report  on.the TAA  explicitly explains 
that  the  so-called  "offset"  ~ul~s contained  in  the 
definition of  "net  subsidy"  under  section  771(6)  of  the 
Tariff  Act  of  1930  are  not  re-levant  to  the  DOC  threshhold 
determination that  a  subsidy exists.  DOC  obviously  cannot 
determine  the  net  subsidy  by  subtracting· amounts  from  a 
subsidy until it has  determined  that  a  "subsidy"  exists  in 
the  first  instance. 
Because  of  some  apparent  confusion  over  the  relationship 
between  the  threshhold  decision  that  a  bounty  or grant 
exists  and  the  necessarily subsequent  determination  of  the 
"net  amount  of  such  bounty  or grant"  under  section  303 
of  the Tariff Act  of  1930  manifested  in dicta  in  one  court 
decision,  ASG  Industries  Inc.  v.  United States,  610  F.2d 
770, ·777  (C.C.P.A.  1979),  Congress,  using  the  same  example 
discussed  by  the  court,  explicitly described  the  proper 
relationship between  the  threshhold  determination  that  a 
"subsidy"  exists  and  subsequent  application  of  the  new 
"net  subsidy"  rules  under Title VII: 
(Footnote  4  continued  on  page  9.) - 9  -
III.  EUROPEAN  COAL  PROGRAMS  ARE  NOT  DIRECT  OR 
INDIRECT  SUBSIDIES  ON  THE  MANUFACTURE,  PRODUCTION 
OR  EXPORTATION  OF  STEEL 
In Appendix  B  to  its notice of  a  preliminary 
determination  relating  to Certain Steel Products  from 
Belgium,  published  in  the  Federal  Register  on  June  11, 
1982  (47  Fed.  Reg.  26300,  26307  (1982)),  the  DOC  states, 
inter alia,  that government  assistance  to  the  European 
Footnote  4  continued: 
The  definition of  "subsidy"  is  intended  to 
clarify that  the  term  has  the  same  meaning  which 
administrative practice  and  the  courts  have 
ascribed  to  the  term  "bounty or grant"  under 
section  303  of  the Tariff Act  of  1930,  unles~ 
the  practice or  interpretation  is  inconsistent 
with  the bill.  In  this regard,  the  restrictions 
on  offsets  contained  in  section  771(6)  of  the 
Tariff Act  of  1930,  as  added  by  the  bill,  are 
not  intended  to prohibit  tbe  _authority  from 
determining  that  export  payments  are  not 
subsidies  ~··  (S.  Rep.  No.  249,  96th  Cong.,  1s~ 
Sess.  84-85  (1979)).  · 
Furthermore,  Congress  clearly. stated  that  its purpose  in 
adopting  section  771(6)  was  to  prevent  some,  but  not  all, 
of  the  offsets  allowed  under  administrative  interpretation 
of  the  term  "net  amount"  of  a  bounty or grant  under 
section  303  from  being  adopted  as  a  proper  interpretation 
of  the  new  "net  subsidy"  term  in Title VII.  The  specific 
offsets prohibited were  for  "indirect  taxes  paid  but  not 
actually  rebated"  and  "increased  costs  as  a  result ·of 
locating  in  an  underdeveloped  region"  (S.  Rep.  No.  249, 
96th.Cong.,  1st Sess.  86  (1979)).  It must  be  noted  that 
the  proscription of  an  offset for  increased  costs  in 
underdeveloped  regions  is  a  violation of  the Subsidies 
Code  obligations of  the  USG  (See  Annex  A at  22;  EC  Legal 
Arguments  at  18).  ---- 10  -
coal  industry which  does  not  reduce  the  price  paid  by  the 
European  steel  industry  for  coking  coal  below  the  world 
price  for  coking  coal  provides  no  "measurable  benefit"  to 
the  steel  industry  and  is  not  a  countervailable  subsidy. 
This  is a  proper  application of  the  international  legal 
obligations of  the  USG  and,  therefore,  of Title. VII of the 
Tariff  Act  of  1930. 
A.  The  Subsidies Code  and  Title VII  Require 
Sufficient Positive Evidence  of  an  Adverse 
Affect  on  Conditions of Normal 
Competition 
Article  11(1)  of  the  Subsidies  Code  expressly 
recognizes  that  signatories  shall  not  be  restricted  in 
their right  to  use  subsidies,  other  than  export  subsidies, 
to  achieve  important  policy objectives,  such  as  to 
facilitate  the  restructuring,  under-socially acceptable 
conditions,  of  certain  sectors.~  Article  11(2)  recognizes, 
'  .  . 
on  the  other  hand,  that  such  subsidies  m~y adversely 
affect  the  conditions of  normal  competition.  Therefore, 
signatories  are  committed  to  seek  to  avoid  causing  such 
effects  and  to  weigh,  as  far  as  practicable,  possible 
adverse  affects  on  competition  in drawing  up  their 
policies. 
When  read  together,  these  provisions  of  the  Code 
provide  a  basis  for  determining  whether  programs  are 
subsidies within  the  meaning  of  the  Code.  It is clear - 11  -
from  the  Code  provisions  that  the  affect of  programs  on 
competition  is of  crucial  importance  to  a  determination  as 
to  whether  a  subsidy exists  within  the  meaning  of  the 
Subsidies  Code.  Furthermore,  judicial  interpretation of 
the  term  "bounty or grant"  under  section  303  of  the Tariff 
Act  of  1930  also  focused  on  the  economic  effect on 
competition.  See  Zenith,  437  u.s.  at  456~  Nicholas  & Co. 
v.  United States,  249  u.s.  34,  41  (1919). 
The  proposition  that  subsidies,  within  the 
meaning  of  the  Subsidies  Code  and  Title VI,  must  have  a 
distorting  affect on  competition  is  reemphasized  by  the 
specific criteria in  paragraph  (d)  of  the  Annex  to  the 
Code.  This  paragraph  makes  it clear  that  no  subsidy 
exists,  within  the  meaning  of the Subsidies  Code,  when  , 
input  factors  are  made  available  bYJJOVernments  on  terms 
- . 
not  more  favorable  than·those  commercially  available  on 
world  markets.  Furthermore,  section  771·( 5)  is replete 
with  standards  based  on  the  concept  of  "normal 
competition",  such  as  "commercial  considerations"  and 
"preferential rates",  which  clearly indicate  that  the 
standard  intended  by  Congress  is  the  standard  under  the 
Code,  i.e.,  there must  be  an  adverse  affect on  conditions 
of  normal  competition.  These  Code  and  statutory 
provisions  reflect  the  traditional  interpretation of  the 
concept  of  subsidy  under  international  law  and  u.s.  law. 
Therefore,  it is  necessary  for  DOC  to establish 
that  a  program  has  an  affect  which  distorts  the  conditions - 12  -
of  normal  competition  before  that  program  can  be 
considered  to  be  a  subsidy within  the  meaning  of  the 
Subsidies  Code  or Title VII.  The  supply of  coking  coal  at 
or above  world  market  prices  cannot  adversely affect 
normal  conditions of  competition  in  the  steel -indust~y. 
So  long  as  European  steel  producers  pay world  prices  for 
coking  coal,  their competitive  position vis  a  ~is other 
steel  producers  and  other  industries  is not  affected.  The 
origin of  that  coal,  the  reasons  that  coking  coal  from  a 
particular source  is sold  at  a  certain price,  and  the 
industry specific nature  of  a  coking  coal  marketing 
· program  are  irrelevant  so  long  as  that price  is  not  below 
world  market  price.  Absent  positive  evidence,  i.e., 
substantial  evidence  on  the  record,  that  an  input  factor 
is  supplied  at  a  price  below  world  ~~rket price,  there  can 
be  no  indirect  subsidy on  manufacture,  production,  or 
exportation. 
It should  be  emphasized  that  the  requirement 
I 
that  a  subsidy,  within  the  meaning  of  the  Subsidies  Code 
and  section 771(5),  adversely affect  normal  conditions of 
competition  is  a  matter  separate  and  distinct  from  the 
injury test in Article 6  of  the Subsidies  Code  and  section 
771(7).  The  question  of distorting  competition  is 
integral  to  the  determination  whether  or  not  a  particular 
program  constitutes a  subsidy.  This  question  centers  on - 13  -
an  analysis  of  the  affect of  the  program  on  the  foreign 
industry.  Only  after it has  been  determined  that  a 
particular program  can  be  deemed  a  "subsidy"  does  the 
issue of  injury to  a  domestic  industry arise.  That  issue 
turns  on  analysis  of  the  impact  of  the  subsidized  impbrts 
on  the  domestic  industry.  A. 
DOC  has  established  that European  prOduction 
assistance  for  all  coal  and  marketing  aids  for  coking  coal 
do  not  result  in  coking  coal  prices  below  world  market 
prices  for  the  European  steel  industry.  DOC  has  reached 
the  only possible  conclusion given  such  facts:  European 
coal  industry assistance  is  not  a  countervailable  subsidy 
to  the  European  steel  industry. 
B.  The  Subsidies Code  and~Title VII 
Prohibit Any  Presumption that  a 
Subsidy Exists 
Appendix  s"contains  a  disturbing  assertion: 
-. 
In  the  absence  of  special  circumstances,  a 
party receiving  a  benefit  on  the  production of 
its merchandise  is not  assumed  to share  that 
benefit with  an  unrelated purchaser.  (47  Fed. 
Reg.  26307,  26309  (1982);  emphasis  supplied) 
The  implication  is  that  the  existence  of  a  countervailable 
subsidy,  i.e., "benefit",  can  be  assumed  in  certain 
0  --
circumstances, ~'  when  suppliers  and  producers  are 
"related."  The  Subsidies  Code  clearly requires 
investigating  authorities  to  establish  the  existence  of - 14  -
elements  necessary  for  imposition  of  countervailing duties 
by positive  factual  evidence.  The  only  instance  in  which 
the  Code  permits  any  presumption  is a  presumption,  in 
footnote  26,  of nullification or  impairment  by  the 
Committee  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures  in· 
dispute  settlement  procedures  involving  violations  of 
specific Code  obligations,  such  as  the  prohibition of 
export  subsidies  in Article 9.  The  only  instance  in  which 
Title VII  permits  a  presumption  is  under  section 
771 (7) (E) (i)  (relating  to U.S.  International Trade 
Commission  (USITC)  consideration  of  proscribed  export 
·Subsidies  and  threat of  injury)  which  is,  arguably,  based 
on  Footnote  15  to  the  Code.  Had  the  Code  or  the Title VII 
draftsmen  intended  any  other derogations  from  the 
requirement  that  administering  autho~ities,  such  as  DOC 
. 
and  USITC,  and  the  Committee  consider  only positive 
factual  evidence,_ they  would  nave  included  specific 
language  as  is contained  in  footnote  26  and  section 
771 (7) (E) ( i). 
Therefore,  DOC  can  never  assume  that  a  subsidy 
exists.  More  explicitly,  DOC  cannot  assume  a 
countervailable  benefit"exists merely  because  a  supplier 
of  an  input  is  related  to  a  producer  of merchandise 
subject  to  investigation.  Positive  evidence,  i.e., 
substantial  evidence  on  the  record,  of  the  benefit  to  the 
producer must  be  produced. - 15  -
IV.  THE  DOC  DETERMINATIONS  WITH  RESPECT  TO  ECSC 
WORKERS'  HOUSING  LOANS  ARE  IMPROPER  AS  A  MATTER 
OF  LAW  AND  ARE  NOT  SUPPORTED  BY  SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE 
In Appendix  C  to its preliminary determination 
on  Certain Steel  Products  from  Belgium  (47  Fed.  Reg. 
26300,  26309),  the  DOC  erroneously states:  .. 
The  preferential  ECSC  housing  loans  provide 
benefits directly to  steel workers.  -we  believe 
they  also  indirectly benefit  the  employer  steel 
companies  by  relieving  them  of  certain labor 
wage  costs.  That  is,  if steel  workers  were 
unable  to obtain  housing  loans  at  these  highly 
advantageous  rates,  the  companies  which  employ 
them  would  be  required  to  pay  higher  wages. 
The  DOC  based  its decision  to  countervail 
against  such  programs  merely  on  supposition  and  conjecture 
rather  than  on  any  evidence  contained  in  the  record.  The 
DOC  admits  in its determination  that  it is countervailing 
against  worker's  housing  loans  only  because  it "believed" 
that  in  the  absence  of  such  aid  the  companies  involved 
"would  be  required  to  pay  higher  wages~·  The  only basis 
for  this belief are  unsupport~d.assertiohs of  the 
petitioners. 
It is,  in  fact,  inconceivable  that  any  program 
as  limited  in  scope  and  effect  as  the  ECSC  worker's 
housing  program  would  have  any  impact  on  wage  rates  paid - 16  -
by  European  steel  companies.  First,  the  amount 
of money  available  for  loan  to  any  individual  is limited 
by  regulation.  Therefore~  individuals must  secure 
additional  funds  from  commercial  sources  to  purchase  a 
home.  Second,  relatively  few  workers  meet  the-eligicrility 
criteria,  including  an  income  test,  of  the  program. 
Third,  few  workers  in  any given  company  are  eligible  for 
the  loans.  Fourth,  not  all eligible workers  use  the 
loans. 
The  small  amount  of  resources  committed  to  this 
program  and  the  small  number  of  beneficiaries  of  the 
· program,  either as  a  percentage  of  the  total  European 
steel  work  force  or  of  the  work  force  of  any  individual 
company,  makes  the  DOC  speculation  that  companies  would  be 
forced,  either as  a  matter  of  law  o~_of general  industrial 
relations,  to  i~crease tneir wage  rates  absent  this 
program  ludicroua at  best. 
Finally,  the  DOC  preliminary determination  is  a 
dangerous  expansion  of  the  concept  of  indirect  subsidy on 
manufacture,  production,  or exportation.  The  GATT 
Subsidies  Code  requires  sufficient positive  evidence  that 
a  practice "adversely affect conditions  of  normal 
competition"  of  the  product  being  investigated.  Under 
u.s.  practice,  this requirement  1~  implemented  by  the 
requirement  that  there  be  substantial evidencQ  of  a - 17  -
countervailable  benefit  on  the manufacture,  production or 
exportation  of  the  merchandise  being  investigated.  This 
test has  not  been  met  and,  indeed,  cannot  be  met  by  the 
ECSC  workers•  housing  loan  program. 
V.  THE  DOC  DETERMINATIONS  ARE  IMPROPER  BECAUSS.THE 
DOC  SHOULD  NOT  HAVE  USED  THE  METHODOLOGY  BY  WHICH  THE 
SUBSIDY  VALUES  WERE  CALCULATED 
Section  516A(b)  of  the Tariff  Act  of 1930  (19 
U.S.C.  §  1516A(b))  sets  forth  the  standards  by  which  the 
subsidy determinations  of  the  DOC  are  evaluated.  Under 
this provision,  a  preliminary determination  is  invalid  if 
it is arbitrary,  capricious,  an  abuse  of discretion or 
·otherwise  not  in  accordance  with  law •. A final 
determination  is  invalid  if it is  not  supported  by  , 
"substantial  evidence  on  the  record .or  is not  otherwise  in 
.·  . 
accordance  with  law."  It· is a  well  established  principle 
of  law  that  an  agency decision that  is based  on  an 
~ 
improper  methodology  does  not  comport  with  these 
standards.  See  Sierra Club  v.  Costle  657  F.2d  298,  333 
(D.C.  Cir.  1981)~  Newsweek  Inc.  v.  United States Postal 
Service  663  F.2d  1186,  1211  (2d  Cir.  1981)~  Batterton v. 
Marshall,  648  F.2d  694, ·111  (D.C.  Cir.  1980). 
A.  Any  Proposed  Change  in  the  DOC's 
Methodology  for  the Calculation of Subsidy 
Value  was  Subject  to the  Rulemaking 
Requirements  of  5  u.s.c.  §  551  et ~· - 18  -
Pursuant  to  section  624  of  the Tariff  Act  of 
1930  (19  u.s.c.  §  1624),  and  Reorganization Plan No.  3  of 
1979,  the  DOC  is  authorized  to make  such  rules  as  are 
necessary  to  implement  the United States  countervailing 
duty  law.  In  the  exercise of  its rulemaking  functions, 
the  DOC  is subject  to  the  notice  and  comment  and  other 
rulemaking  procedures  of  the  "Administrative P£ocedure 
Act"  (APA)  (5  u.s.c.  §  551  et ~.; See  45  Fed.  Reg.  4932 
(1980)).  Although  the  DOC  has  not  seen  fit  in  the  present 
case  to  acknowledge  that  its methodology  is  a  "rule,"  it 
is  clear that,  under  the  APA,  the  DOC  methodology  is  a 
rule  and  is subject  to  the  notice  and  comment  and  other 
rulemaking  procedures  of  the  APA. 
In Batterton v.  Marshall,  648  F.2d  694  (D.C. 
Cir.  1980),  the  court  held  that modification  of  the 
Department  of Labor's  method  of  calculating  unemployment 
.  . . 
statistics was  a  ~ulemaking  ~ithin the  meaning  of 5  u.s.c. 
§  551  and  subject to  the  netic~ and  comment  requirements 
of  5  u.s.c.  §  553.  The  statistics were  a  critical  factor 
in computations  under  a  statutory formula  for  allocating 
monies  under  the  Comprehensive  Employment  and  Training  Act 
(CETA)  and  the  Labor  Department's  change  in  its 
methodology  was  first  announced  in  the  course  of  the 
proceedings  during  which  the  funds  were  allocated. - 19  -
Similarly,  in  the  present  case,  the  methodology 
used  in determining  subsidy values  has  a  direct 
substantial effect on  the  amount  of  the  countervailing 
duty,  and  hence  is a  critical  factor  under  the 
countervailing  duty statute.  Like  the  statistics in . 
Batterton,  the  subsidy value  methodology  here  serves  more 
than  merely  informational  purposes.  648  F.2d  at  705.  The 
methodology  is  not merely  an  interpretation of  statutory 
language  because  it actually prescribes  the  regulatory 
structure  through  which  the  critical variable  in  the 
formula  is attained.  Id.  at  705-06.  Consequently,  the 
DOC  should  not  have  adopted  the  new  methodology  in  an 
adjudicatory  proceeding  but  should  have  filed  notice  in 
the  Federal Register  and  given  interested  parties 
opportunity to  comment  as  specified  in  5  u.s.c.  §  553. 
..  . 
The  improprie~y of  the  DOC's  attempt  to  avoid 
the  notice  and  comment  requirements  of  the  APA  is 
heightened  in  the  present  case pecause  Congress 
specifically intended  that  any  change  in  the  methodology 
by  which  the  value  of  subsidies  are  calculated  be 
accomplished  by  rulemaking.  Furthermore,  the  DOC  has 
previously  recognized  the  requirement  for  such 
rulemaking. - 20  -
First,  Congress  was  fully  aware  of  the  existing 
administrative  practice  with  respect  to  the  calculation of 
the value  of  subsidies  when  it passed  the  Trade  Agreements 
Act  of  1979.  While  Congress  did  not  express  an  opinion 
directly with  respect  to  the  substantive methodology.to  be 
used  by  the  DOC,  it did  manifest· its  intentio~.as to  how 
this methodology  was  to  be  implemented  when  i~approved 
the  Statement  of  Administrative  Action  which  states: 
The  Authority will develop guidelines  with 
regard  to  the  calculation of  subsidies,  building 
on  existing  case  law  consistent  with  the  new  -
legislation.  (H.R.  Doc.  No.  153,  Part II,  96th 
Cong.,  1st Sess.  4 33  ( 1979)  (hereinafter  as 
Statement)). 
The  Administration  was  required  by  section  102  of  the 
Trade  Act of  1974  to describe  in  the  ~tatement of  Adminis-
trative Action  the  manner  in  which  the  Trade  Agreements 
Act  was  to  be  implemented.  The  Sta~ement makes  clear: 
In  administer.ing , th,e  new  legislation, 
regula~ions will  b~ promulgated  •••  [A]s 
experience  is gained  in  administering  the 
legislation,  additional  regulations may  be 
issued.  (Statement  at  389). 
Furthermore,  the  DOC  itself has  recognized  its 
obligation to  adopt  regulations  to  implement  any  change  in 
its methodology  for  the  calculation  of  subsidy values.  On 
October.  3,  1979,  the  Customs  Service  issued,  subject  to 
the  APA,  a  notice of  proposed  rulemaking  to  implement 
various  provisions of  the  Trade  Agreements  Act.  Among  the - 21  -
proposed  regulations  was  19  C.F.R.  §  155.4  which  specified 
the  manner  in  which  the  value  of  a  subsidy  was  to  be 
calculated  for  purposes  of  the  new  countervailing  duty 
law.  On  January  22,  1980,  final  regulations  on  these 
matters  were  issued  by  DOC,  which  had  succeed~d to  the 
responsibilities of  the  Customs  Service  under 
Reorganization Plan  No.  3  of  1979  and  Executi~e Order  No. 
12188.  These  final  regulations,  however,  did  not  include 
the  proposed  Section  155.4.  Instead,  the  notice  stated: 
The  Department  of  Commerce  is deferring 
publication of  final  regulations  on  issues 
covered  by  certain  sections of  the  proposed 
regulations  of  the  Customs  Service  published  in 
the  Federal Register  of October  3,  1979; 
principally those  provisions  relating  to  the 
determination  and  calculation of  net  subsidy 
• • • •  Final  regulations  on 'these  issues  are  not 
necessary  immediately  for  the  conduct  of  the 
countervailing  duty  program.  ' 
Moreover,  these  issues  ar~ complex,  and  the 
Department  p~efers to gain  as  much  experience  as 
possible  o~ these  issues prior to publishing 
final  regulations.  (45  Fed.  Reg.  4932 
(1980)  emphasis  supplied). 
Therefore,  the  DOC  has  explicitly-acknowledged  that  any 
change  in  its methodology  for  the  calculation of  subsidy 
values  should  only  be  undertaken  in  the  context  of  a 
rulemaking  proceeding. 
B.  DOC  Procedures  Under  the Countervailing 
Duty Statute in this  Investigatibn Do 
Not  Satisfy the  Requirements  of  the  APA 
The  publication of  a  brief  descr~ption of  its 
methodology  as  part of  the  preliminary determination  and 
the  subsequent  hearings  on  the  preliminary determination - 22  -
provided  by  the  DOC  do  not  satisfy the  requirements  for 
notice  and  comment  appropriate  to  regulations.  Further, 
the  respondents  have  been  prejudiced  by  the  adoption  of 
the  new  methodology. 
First,  the  APA  requires  a  separate  rulemaking 
apart  from  any  adjudication,  such  as  a  counter~ailing duty 
proceeding,  for  the  adoption  of  regulations.  It is 
improper  as  a  matter  of  law  to  attempt  to  circumvent  the 
procedural  requirements  set  by  Congress  for  rulemaking, 
particularly where  Congress  has  mandated,  as  it has  in  the 
present  case,  the  adoption  of  regulations  on  a  particular 
subject.  See  NLRB  v.  Wyman-Gordon  Co.,  394  u.s.  759, 
764-5  (1969);  Ford  Motor  Co.  v.  FTC,  673  F.2d  1008,  1010 
(9th  Cir.  1981);  Texaco,  Inc.  v.  Federal  Power 
Commission,  412  F.2d  740,  744  (3d  CiJ.  1969). 
Second,  even  a·s·suming the possibility of  comment 
on  the  methodolog.y  at this  time~· the  respondents  have 
.  ~ 
already suffered  serious  injury as  the  result  of  the 
DOC's  action.  A preliminary  subsidy determination  in  a 
countervailing  duty  investigation  results  in  the 
suspension of  liquidation of  imports  and  the  requirement 
for  ~he posting  of  bonds,  premiums  for  which  are  not 
reco~ered even  if the  suspension  of liquidation  is 
subsequently  terminated.  Furthermore,  the  uncertainty 
resulting  from  DOC's  pr~liminary determination  has  caused - 23  -
American  consumers  to  refuse  to  purchase  respondent's 
products  and,  in  some  cases,  resulted  in  these  companies' 
effective  exclusion  from  the United States market. 
Third,  the  hearings  provided  by  the  DOC  on  the 
preliminary determinations  are  not  comparable-to  the. 
rulemaking  procedures  required  by  the  APA.  Congress 
itself recognized  this  fact  when  it provided  that  the 
hearings  of  the  DOC  in  countervailing duty  cases  are  not 
subject  to the  requirements  of· the  APA.  19  u.s.c. 
§  1677c{b). 
Further,  the  DOC  hearings  are  limited  to  the 
participants  in  this  case.  As  exemplified  by  the DOC's 
May  10,  1982  hearings  on  the  administ~ation of  the 
countervailing  duty law,  many  persons  other  than  the  , 
participants  in  this  case  have  an  interest  in  the  general 
procedures  of  the  DOC  with  respect  to  the  calculation of 
subsidies.  The  principal.purpose  of  th~ rulemaking 
procedures  of  the  APA  is  to  permit  such  persons  an 
opportunity to  comment  on  rules  that  will  be  applied  to 
them. 
Fourth,  the  DOC  is  under  a  special  oblig~tion 
not  to  act  precipitously to  change  its practices  under  the 
countervailing  duty  law.  As  the  Supreme  Court  observed  in 
respect  to  an  argument  that  the  Secretary of  the  Treasury - 24  -
should  have  changed  his  longstanding  practice with  respect 
to  the  noncountervailability of  nonexcessive  tax 
remissions: 
At  the  same  time,  the Secretary's position 
has  been  incorporated  into  the General  Agreement 
on Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT),  which  rs  followed 
by  every major  trading  nation  in  the  world; 
foreign  tax  systems  and  private  expe~tations 
thus  have  been  built on  the  assumption  that 
countervailing duties  would  not  be  i~posed on 
nonexcessive  remissions  of  indirect  taxes.  In 
light of  these  substantial  reliance  interests, 
the  longstanding  administrative  construction of 
the  statute  should  not  be  disturbed  except  for 
cogent  reasons.  Zenith  Radio  Corp.  v.  u.s.,  437 
U.S.  443,  457  (1978)  (footnotes  and  citation  · 
omitted)). 
For  the  DOC  to  adopt  unilaterally a  methdology 
for  the  calculation of  subsidies,  in  the  face,  as 
described in Annexes  A and  B,  of USG  international 
obligations  to  the  contrary,  clearly  upsets  the 
~~ 
longstanding  expectations of  both  private parties  and  .. 
foreign governments.  Given  the. broad  implications  of  such 
.  . 
a  major  change  in u.s.  administrative  pr~ctice with 
respect  to  the  calculation of  subs-idy values,  the  DOC  is 
under  the  obligation to  solicit  comments  of all  interested 
persons,  not  only  those  in  these  cases. - 25  -
C.  The  Methodology Used  by  the  DOC  is 
Arbitrary,  Capricious,  an  Abuse  of 
Discretion  and  Otherwise  not  in Accordance 
with  Law  as  a  Means  of Calculatlng 
the Value  of  a  Subs1dy  under  the Trade 
Agreements  Act  of  1979. 
1.  Present value methodology does  not 
provide  a  "real"  value. 
The  DOC  has  asserted  that it adopted- the  present 
value  methodology  as  a  means  of  capturing  the ~time value 
of money"  in  the  calculation of  subsidy value.  Even  if 
one  assumes  it is proper  to  include  the  time  value  of 
money  in  the  calculation of  subsidies,  the  present value 
methodology  is nevertheless  an  improper  measure  of  this 
value.  The  present value  methodology  is  an  abstract 
construct  the  purpose  of  which  is to compare  hypothetical 
alternative  uses  of money,  by  holding  const~nt various 
real  world  factors.  It does  not  determine  what  the  "real" 
or  "actual"  results of  an  investment  will  be  in  the  future 
but  rather provides  an  abstract value  wnich  can  be 
compared  with  the  abstract value  of  alte~native 
investments. 
2.  The  assumptions  of  the present 
value methodology  do  not  reflect 
the realities of  the present 
investigations. 
The  present value  methodology  provides  a 
hypothetical  comparison  between  alternative  investments 
based  upon  certain static assumptions.  Two  of  the 
principal  assumptions  of  the  present  value.methodology are - 26  -
a  constant  interest rate  and  the  ability of  the  person 
using  the  methodology  to  make  the  alternative  investments. 
The  assumption  of  a  constant  interest rate  obviously does 
not  comport  with  reality, but  its use  in  the  formula  is 
analytically justified because  the  purpose  of  ~he 
methodology  is merely  to  compare  hypothetical  .. 
alternatives.  In  any  attempt  determine  the  nr~aln  value 
of money,  as must  be  done  under  the  countervailing  duty 
statute,  it is of  course  improper  to make  such  a  static 
assumption. 
The  present value  methodology  also  assumes  that 
· alternative  uses  of money  exist.  The  DOC  assumes  that 
this alternative  use  would  be  the  investment  of  the  money 
in  a  bank  at  the  interest rate  which  is  used  in  the 
methodology.  This  assumption  is totally inappropriate  in 
the  present  case.  The  m0nies  provided  by governments  to  . . 
industries  in  Eu~ope are  ntie~n  to  a  particular  use,  be  it 
the  making  up  of  operating deficits or  the  purchase  of 
capital  assets.  The  companies  receiving  such  funds  do  not 
have  the  option  the  DOC  blithly  assumed  of  investing  such 
funds  anywhere  and  receiving  income.  Further,  the  DOC  has 
no  evidence  whatsoever  that  the  provision of  such  monies 
by  g~vernment has  permitted  companies  to  use  other  funds 
at their disposal  for  such  purposes.  Indeed,  if the  DOC - 27  -
is  to  be  believed,  many  companies  could  not  have  obtained 
such  funds  either  from  their  own  operations,  because  they 
were  not  making  profits,  or  from  other  sources,  because 
they  were  "uncreditworthy." 
3.  There  is no  ju~tification, either in 
legislative,  administrative or  judicial 
precedent,  for  the  use  of  th~ present 
value methodology. 
The  Department  itself admits  there  is  no 
administrative precedent  for  the  use  of  the  present value 
methodology.  It states  in Appendix  B: 
In  the  past  we  have  allocated  the  face  value 
of  the grant,  in  equal  increments,  over  the 
appropriate  time  period  •••  [we]  are  now 
changing  the  methodology  of_grant  subsidy 
calculation  • • •  ( 4 7  Fed.  Reg.  26307  ( 1982)) 
Similarly,  there  is  no  justification  in  the'Tariff  Act  of 
19 30  for  the  present  value  methodology._  Congress  intended 
that  the  value  of a  ~et subsidy  reflect  the  amounts 
bestowed  "actually used"  by  tpe  recipien~s (H.  Rep.  No. 
317,  96th  Cong.,  1st Sess.  74  (1979)).  The  present value 
methodology  is totally inconsistent  with  this  requirement 
because,  far  from  reflecting  the  amount  of  the  subsidy 
used,  it generates  a  hypothetical  value  of  the  subsidy  in 
the  future  based  on  arbitrary  and  unrealistic  assumptions. 
Such  a  value  cannot  be  actually  used  by  recipients. - 28  -
4.  The  present value methodology  is 
inconsistent with u.s.  international 
obl1gat1ons. 
Under  the Subsidies  Code,  it is  impermissible 
for  a  signatory  to  impose  a  countervailing  duty  in  excess 
of  the  amount  of  the  subsidy  found  to  "exist"  ~Artic}e 
4(2)).  The  word  "exist"  clearly means  the  nominal  amount 
of  assistance granted  by  a  government,  not  an  arbitrary 
estimate  of  a  hypothetical  future  value.  This  approach 
was  established  in  GATT  and  USG  practice when  the  Code  was 
adopted.  As  evidenced  by  footnote  15  of  the  Code,  the 
Signatories  agreed  that,  if any  change  in  the  criteria for 
calculating  the  amount  of  subsidies  wa·s  to  be  made,  it 
should  be  the  subject of  further  international 
negotiations.  For  the  DOC  to  implement  a  unilateral 
change  in U.S.  practice which  resul~~ in  the  levying  of 
duty  in  an  amount  which·is  as  much  as  four  times  greater  . 
than  the  amount  which  actually exists  is· a  clear  breach  of 
USG  international  legal  obligations  which  nullif~es or 
impairs  benefits  to other signatories  to  the  Code  and 
GATT. ANNEX  A 
MEMORANDUM  ON  UNITED  STATES  PRELIMINARY 
COUNTERVAILING  DUTY  DETERMINATIONS  CONCERNING 
EUROPEAN  STEEL  EXPORTS 
(Submitted  by  the  Commission  of  the European 
Communities  to GATT  Committee  on  Subsidies  and 
Countervailing Measures,  July 15,  19821 
INTRODUCTION 
On  10  June  1982,  the United  States Department  of 
Commerce  (DOC)  published  the  preliminary determinations-of 
subsidization  in  the  countervailing  duty  investigations  in 
respect  of  certain steel  products  from  the United  Kingdom, 
Netherlands,  France,  Italy,  Federal  Republic  of Germany, 
Belgium  and  Luxembourg.  These  investigations  cover  a 
volume  of  trade  estimated  at  close  to  3  million  net  tons, 
on  the  basis of  1981  import  figures,  with  a  value  of  1.3  -
1.5 billion dollars. 
Apart  from  the  magnitude  of  the  trade  involved, 
these determinations  raise  important  and  novel  issues 
under  the  Agreement  on  Interpretation  and  Application of 
Articles VI,  XVI  and  XXIII  of  the General  Agreement  on 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (Subsidies  Code),  such  as: 
Whether  a  subsidy  should  be  calculated  by 
reference  in  the  cost  to  the  government  or  to  the 
hypothetical  benefits  to  the  recipient: - 2  -
Whether  it is  legitimate  to  inflate  the  amount 
granted  by  taking  account  of  a  notional  "time value of 
money"1 
In  what  circumstances .can  government 
participation  in  a  company  be  counted  as  a  subsidy  and  how 
should  the  amount  of  any  such  subsidy  be  calculated1 
Does  the Illustrative List  annexed  to  the 
Subsidies  Code  apply to Part  I  of the  Code  or  is  its 
relevance  restricted to Part II,  with  the  result  that  a 
stricter discipline  is  applied  to domestic  subsidies  under 
Part  I  than  to  export  subsidies  under Part IIi 
Should  the  subsidy  element  involved  in  any 
government  loans  or  loan  guarantees  be  assessed  by  analogy 
to  the  guidelines given  in  the  Illustrativ~ List  annexed 
to  the Subsidies  Code1  --
Is it legitimate to  countervail  subsidies 
insofar  as  they  have  no  trade  dis~orting- effect,  such  as 
.. 
regional  aids  which  simply  compens_ate  for  the  industrial, 
economic  and  social disadvantages  of  certain  regions1  and 
How  can  the  principle  that domestic  subsidies 
which  have  no  such  trade distorting effect  are  rec9gnized 
as  important  instruments  for  the  promotion  of  social  and 
economic  policy objectives  be  reconciled  with  the  fact 
that  certain signatories  to  the  Subsidies  Code  mandatorily 
countervail  the  full  amount  of  any  subsidy  and  thus  do  not - 3  -
comply  with  the  principle  that  countervailing duties 
should  be  less  than  the  total  amount  of  the  subsidy  if 
such  lesser duty will  be  adequate  to  remove  the  injury to 
the  domestic  industry. 
In  some  instances,  the u.s.  preliminary 
determinations  represent  a  complete  departure  from 
hitherto undisputed  interpretations  of  the General 
Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  and  the Subsidies 
Code  and  are,  in  the Community's  view,  in direct  conflict 
with  the  letter as  well  as  the spirit of  these  agreements. 
In  other  cases,  they  are  based  on  extreme  and  unilateral 
findings  on  issues  never  before  decided,  some  of  which  had 
deliberately been  left unresolved  fo~ further  negotiations 
among  signatories.  They  are  also  arbitrary or  based  on 
disputable  economic  premises  or  logic  • 
.  These  determiRations  call  into question  the 
delicate  balance  of  advantages  reached  during  the Tokyo 
, 
Round  of  Multilateral Trade Negotiations:  They  have 
implications  for  many  countries  and  industries currently 
exporting  to  the United  States.  The  Community  has 
therefore  asked  for  a  special  discussion  of  the  DOC 
determinations  in  the  GATT  Committee  on  Subsidies  and 
Coun~ervailing Measures. 
The  attached  note  sets  out  - in  summary  form 
with  relevant  excerpts  from  the  DOC  notices  - the  DOC 
preliminary determinations  and  the  counterarguments  to  the - 4  -
legal  construction  and  method  followed  by  the  DOC.  The 
Community  would  welcome  a  thorough  discussion  by  the 
signatories  to  the  Code  of  the  important  issues  involved, 
ideally with  a  view  to  reaching  a  consensus  and  thus 
avoiding  further  unilateral action  which  may  ~~feet  ~he 
practices of all signatories,  including  subsidi.es  granted 
by  the United States. 
ARGUMENT 
I.  GATT  CONDITIONS  FOR  COUNTERVAILABILITY 
Article VI  of  the  GATT  and  the  Subsidies  Code 
lay down  a  certain number  of  criteria and  conditions  which 
must  be  met  before  countervailing  dut~es can  be  imposed. 
These  are  as  follows: 
There  must  be  a  subsi9y granted  directly or 
indirectly on  the  production,  manufacture  or  export  of  a  . 
product.1  The  text of  the  C¢de  clearly-implies  that  a 
subsidy must  involve  a  charge  ~n the  pubiic  account.2 
Because  countervailing duties may  not  exceed  the  amount  of 
1  GATT  Article VI,  paragraph  3. 
2  See Subsidies Code, ·in particular  item  (1)  of  the 
Annei:' - 5  -
the  subsidy granted,3  the  calculation of  this  amount 
is of  crucial  importance.  This  is expressly  recognized  by 
footnote  15  of  the Subsidies  Code. 
In  addition,  a  subsidy must  adversely  affect 
the  conditions  of  normal  competition.  In  the ~bsence of 
any  such  distortion,  subsidies,  other  than  export 
subsidies,  are  recognized  as  legitimate  instruments  for 
the  promotion  of  social  and  economic  policy objectives 
against  which  no  action  is  envisaged  by  the  Code.4  It 
is  fundamental,  therefore,  that  the  existence  of  such 
trade distortion must  be  established,  especially where 
signatories  do  not  comply  with  the  GATT  principle  that  the 
amount  of  any  countervailing  duty  should  be  less  than  the 
total  amount  of  the  subsidy  if  such  lesser duty  would  be 
adequate  to  remove  the  injury.5  This  is of particular 
-
importance  with  respect·to programs  such  as  regional  aids, 
research  and  development  and  coking  coaY  programs. 
There  must  be  material  injury to a  domestic 
industry.6 
3  Article VI,  supra  note  1  • 
4  Subsidies  Code,  Article  11 • 
5  S~bsidies Code,  Article  4 ( 1 ) • 
6  Subsidies Code,  Article  2 ( 1 ) • - 6  -
Finally it must  be  demonstrated  that  such 
injury is  caused  by  the  subsidized  imports,  through  the 
effects of  the  subsidy.? 
II.  DETERMINATION  OF  AMOUNT  OF  SUBSIDY 
A.  DOC  Determination 
1.  Summary 
In determining  the  amount  of  subsidy  involved  in 
grants,  preferential  loans  or  loan guarantees,  the DOC, 
instead  of  looking  at  the  amount  granted,  took  account  of 
a  notional  "time  value  of money"  on  the  basis  that money 
received  today  is more  valuable  than  money  tomorrow.  This 
. 
approach  concentrates  on  the  alleged .benefit  to  the 
- recipient  rather  than  the  financial  contribution of  the  , 
government.  Moreover,  it results  i9  a  grant of  1000 
allocated  over  15  year~·at a  discount  rate of  15  percent 
being  countervailed  in  an  amount  of  2565  at  an.  annual  rate 
of  171  instead  of·66.6,  or,  even  using  the  former  U.S. 
"front-loading"  technique,  133  over  half  the  period. 
2.  Quotation  from  DOC  Determinations 
"It has  been  argued  that $10  million  [si~]  today 
is much  more  valuable  to  a  grant  recipient  than  $100 
million  [sic]  per  year  for  the  next  10  years,  since  the 
7  Subsidies  Code,  Article 6(4). - 7  -
present  value  of  the  latter is  considerably less  than  $100 
million.  We  agree,  and  are  now  changing  our  methodology 
of grant  subsidy calculation  to reflect this  agreement. 
So  long  as  the  present value  (in  the  year  of grant 
receipt)  of  the  amounts  allocated  over  time  does  not 
exceed  the  face  value  of  the grant,  we  are  consistent  with 
both  our domestic  law  and  international  obligations 
because  the  amount  countervailed will  not  exceed  the  total 
net  subsidy. 
"Present value  is calculated  using  a  discount-
rate.  We  considered  using  each  company's  weighted  cost  of 
capital  at  the  time  of  the grant  receipt  as  the 
appropriate  measure  of  the  time  value ~f its  funds. 
However,  we  lacked  sufficient  information  to  do  so  for 
these preliminary determinations.  Instead  we  used  the 
national.cost of  long-term  corporate debt  as  a  substitute 
measure  of  a  company's  discount  rate.  We  welcome 
additional  information or  comments  on  th~s estimate 
between  the  preliminary  and  final  determinations. 
"For  costly pieces  of  capital  equipment,  we 
believe  that  the  appropriate  time  period  over  which  to 
allocate  the  subsidy is·its entire  useful  life.  In  the 
past,  we  allocated  the  subsidy  over  only  half  the  useful 
life  in order  to  front-load  the  countervailing  duties  in 
order to  comply  with  the  legislative  intent  of  the  Act. - 8  -
However,  so  long  as  we  allocate  the  subsidy  in  equal 
nominal  increments  over  the  entire  useful  life, it will 
still be  effectively front  loaded  in  real  terms  since 
money  tomorrow  is less valuable  than  money  today." 
B.  Counterarguments 
1.  Article VI  of the  GATT  provides ·that  a 
countervailing duty may  not  exceed  the  amount -of  the 
subsidy  "determined  to have  been  granted."  The  use  of  the 
word  "granted"  rather  than  "received"  and  the  absence  of 
any  reference  to "value"  or  "benefit"  indicates  clearly 
that  the  countervailable  amount  is  the  financial 
contribution of  the  government  rather  than  the  much  more 
nebulous  benefit  to  the  recipient. 
The  Illustrativ;List8 annexed  to  the  , 
Subsidies  Code  sets out  eleven  spec~fic types  of  export 
subsidy.  The  last  item·,·  item  {1),  refers  to  "any other 
t  .  .  • 
charge  on  the  public  account-cons~ituting an  export 
subsidy."  The  clear  inference  from  this  is  that  the 
preceding  items  on  the list also  involve  a  charge  on  the 
public  account  and  that  it is this  charge  which 
constitutes  the  subsidy.  This  is  borne  out  by  the  wording 
8  The  relevance  of  the Illustrative List  to 
national  government  countervailing  duty  laws  is  discussed 
in Annex  B. - 9  -
of  the  items  themselves  which  repeatedly  use  such  terms  as 
"provision",  "delivery",  "remissions",  "exemption", 
"grant"  by governments.  Accordingly  the  traditional 
interpretation of signatories,  including  the United  · 
States,  has  been  that  the  amount  countervailable  is· the 
amount  of  the  financial  contribution of  the  go~ernment. 
2.  It could  be  argued  that  the  "opportunity 
cost"  to  the  government  should  be  taken  into  account. 
This,  however,  would  be  quite  unrealistic, given  the 
purpose  and  functions  of  government.  The  prime  function 
of  a  government  is  not  necessarily  to place  money  at  the 
highest  possible  return,  although,  in.certain 
circumstances  it may,  of  course,  act  in  the  same  way  as 
any  other  investor  or  shareholder.  This  is  accepted  by 
~-
the  Subsidy  Code  itself·which,  in Article  11,  recognizes 
the  right of  signatories  to  use  subsidies  for  the 
"promotion of  social  and  economic  policy.objectives" 
including  the  elimination of  regional  disadvantages, 
facilitation of  restructuring  under  socially acceptable 
conditions  of  certain sectors,  and  maintenance  of 
employment.· 
Even  if one  were  to  accept  the  concept  of  an 
opportunity  cost  to  the  government,  it would  be  necessary, 
in  order  to measure  this cost,  to  look  at  the  alternatives - 10  -
available.  The  result of  a  laisser-faire attitude would, 
in many  cases,  be  the  exacerbation  of  regional 
disadvantages,  allowing  the  steel  industry  to  be 
restructured  under  totally unacceptable  social  conditions 
and  dramatically  increasing  unemployment.  In  addition  to 
social  unrest,  this  would  lead  to  the  government  expending 
on  unemployment  pay  as  much  or more  money  as  was  used  to 
aid  the  industry  concerned. 
3.  The  fact  that  th~ benefit  to  the  recipient 
is  not  the  correct  way  to measure  a  subsidy  can  also  be 
demonstrated  by  looking  at  the  problems  involved  in 
measuring  the  benefit.  It is quite  clear  that  the  benefit 
does  not  automatically equal  or  exceed  the  rate of 
interest which  could  be  realized  by depositing  the  amount 
of  the  grant  in  a  bank. 
In  the  presen~.cases,  for  example,  the 
recipients did  not  have  the  a~t~rnative· of  dep.ositing  the 
grants  at bank  interest rates.  The  funds  were  provided 
specifically to  allow  the  company  to restructure  in  a 
socially acceptable  way.  Furthermore,  because,  according 
to  the  DOC,  the  recipients  could  not  in  many  cases  have 
raised  money  through  the  normal  commercial  channels,  the 
benefit  cannot  be  the  hypothetical  interest  saved  in  not 
borrowing  commercially. - 11  -
It is clear,  therefore,  that  the  benefit of  a 
grant  to  the  recipient will vary  according  to  the 
circumstances of  the  recipient  at  the  time  of  receipt. 
There  is  no  simple  or  constant measure  of  the  benefit,  and 
the difficulty of measuring  it shows  that,  from-a 
practical point  of view,  as  well  as  from  a  theoretical 
point of view,  the  correct measure  of  a  subsidy  can  only 
be  the  amount  of  the  financial  contribution of  the 
government.  The  same  arguments  apply,  mutatis mutandis, 
to  loans  to  allegedly uncreditworthy  companies. 
III.  SPECIFIC  ISSUES 
It is  not  intended  in  this  paper  to  examine 
every objectionable  aspect  of  the  DOC  preliminary 
-
determinations,  such  as  ~he countervailing  of  aids  to 
workers' .housing.  Rather,  a  few  issues  nave  been  chosen 
"'  for discussion  which  raise particularly  important  issues 
of  GATT  interpretation  and  which  are  of  considerable 
importance  in  the  context of  these  particular cases.  The 
Community,  however',  reserves  the  right  to  take  up  any  or 
all of  the  other points  at  an  appropriate  time. 
A.  Equity Infusions 
1.  DOC  Determination 
a.  Summary 
The  DOC  determinations  recognize  three different 
situations  relating  to government  purchase  of  equity  and 
come  to  the  following  conclusions: - 12  -
Where  the  government  buys  a  company's  shares 
on  the  open  market  at market  prices  no 
subsidy exists: 
Where  a  market  exists  for  shares  but  the 
government  buys  the  shares directly  from  the 
company,  the  DOC  compares  the  price paid  by 
the  government  with  the  market  price  some 
time  before  purchase:  if the government  paid 
a  higher  price  than  the market  price at that 
earlier date,  a  subsidy exists  in  the  amount 
of  the difference  in  price:  and 
If no  market  exists  for  the  shares,  the  rate 
of  return  to  the  government  is ·compared  with 
the  average return  on  industrial  investment:  , 
if the  return  to  the  government  is  less  than 
the  average,  a  subsidy exists  in  the  amount 
of  the difference  in  returns,  ev~n taking  '  .  -
account  of  negative  return~. 
b.  Quotation  from  DOC  Determinations 
"It is well  settled  that government  equity 
ownership~~ is· not  a  subsidy.  Such  ownership  is  a 
sub~idy only  when  it is on  terms  inconsistent with 
commercial  considerations.  An  equity  subsidy potentially 
arises  when  the  government  makes  equity  infusions  into  a 
company  which  is sustaining  deep  or  significant  continuing - 13  -
losses.  If such  losses  have  been  incurred,  then  we 
consider  from  whom  the  equity was  purchased  and  at what 
price. 
"If the  government  buys  previously  issued  shares 
on  the market  and  not directly  from  the  company,  there  is 
no  subsidy  to  the  company.  This  is true  no  matter  what 
. 
price  the  government  pays,  since  any  overpayment ?enefits 
only  the  prior shareholders  and  not  the  company. 
"If the  government  buys  shares directly  from  the 
company  (either a  new  issue or  corporate  treasury stock) 
and  similar shares  are  traded  in  a  market,  a  subsidy 
.arises  if the  government  pays  more  than  the  prevailing 
market  price.  To  avoid  any  effect on  the market  price 
resulting  from  the government's  purchase  or  speculation  in 
anticipation of  such  purchase,  we  used  for  comparison  a 
market  price  on  a  date  sufficiently preceding  the 
government's  action.  Any  amount  of  overpayment  is  treated 
as  a  grant to the  company. 
"It is more  difficult to  judge  the  possible 
subsidy effects of direct government  infusions of  equity 
where  there  is no  market  price  for  the  shares  since  they 
were  untraded  (as  where,  for  example,  the  government  is 
already  sole  owner  of  the  company).  As  a  matter  of 
principle, government  equity participation  can  be  a 
legitimate  commercial  venture.  Often,  however,  as  in 
'I - 14  -
many  of  these  steel  cases,  equity  infusions  follow massive 
or  sustained  losses  and  are  part  of  national  government 
programs  to sustain or rationalize  an  industry  which 
otherwise  would  be  non-competitive.  We  respect  the 
government's  characterization of  its  infusion -as  equity  in 
a  commercial  venture.  However,  to  the  extent in  any  year 
that  the  government  realizes  a  rate  of  return ~n its 
equity  investment  less  than  the  average  rate  of  return  on 
equity  investment  for  the  country  as  a  whole  (thus 
including  returns  on  both  successful  and  unsuccessful 
investments),  its equity  infusion  is  considered  a  subsidy. 
Under  no  circumstances  do  we  countervail  an  amount  greater 
than  that  which  is  calculated  treating  the  government's 
equity  infusion  as  an  outright grant." 
2.  Counterarguments 
There  is clearly no  objection  to  the  decision 
that  there  is  no  subsidy  whete .the  state buys .the  shares 
on  the  open  market  at market  prices.  where  government 
buys  shares,  which  are  also offered  in  the  stock market, 
directly  from  the  company,  it is  extremely arbitrary for 
determining· the  exfstence  and  amount  of  a  subsidy  to pick 
a  market  value  over  a  short  period  some  weeks  before  the 
government  purchase. 
In  addition,  this  approach  does  not  take  account 
of  the  fact  that  the  intrinsic value  of  the  shares,  based 
on  asset value,  may  be  more  than  their market  price  and - 15  -
that  an  investor may,  therefore,  be  prepared  to  pay  a 
premium  for  control  of  the  company  and  thus  of its assets. 
It is quite  normal  also  that  a  rational  investor,  such  as 
a  company  making  a  tender offer  in  the United States,  will 
pay  a  premi  urn  over  the  market  price  if he  has  reason .to 
believe  that  new  management  and  the  infusion of  capital 
will  allow  a  rate of  return greater  than  in  the  past  and 
therefore greater ·than  the  stock market  has  anticipated. 
Where  the  government  buys  shares  for  which  there 
is  no  market  price,  it is total'ly arbitrary .to  look  at  · 
average  returns.  It follows  from  GATT  that  the  decisive 
criterion is  the  cost  to  the  government  and  therefore  the 
investment  should  be  treated  as  a  long-term  loan  by  the 
government  and  the  long-term  return  should  be  measured 
against  the  rate  at  which  the  government  borrowed  the  .-
money  to.make  the  investment. 
B.  Loans 
~ 
1.  DOC  Determination 
I.  Summary 
The  DOC  determinations  distinguish  between 
creditworthy  and  allegedly  uncreditworthy  companies.  This 
dist.inction  is  based  on·  the  assumption  that  companies 
beca~e uncreditworthy  in  the  first year  in  which  they made 
losses.  Any  subsequent  loans  are  treated  as  equity 
infusions. - 16  -
Where  companies  are  regarded  as  creditworthy, 
the  rate of  interest  charged  for  the  loan  is  compared  to 
the  rate of  interest which  would  have  been  charged  to  the 
company  for  a  normal  commercial  loan,  and,  if lower,  the 
difference  is  treated  as  a  subsidy. 
b.  Quotation  from  u.s.  Determinations 
"In  these  investigations,  various  loan 
activities give  rise  to  subsidies.  The  most  common 
practice  is  the  extension  of  a  loan  at  a  preferential 
interest rate  where  the  government  is either  the  actual 
lender  or directs  a  private  bank  to  lend  at  a  preferential 
rate.  The  subsidy  is computed  by  comparing  what  a  company 
would  pay  a  normal  conunercial  lender  in principal  and 
interest  in  any  given yearwith  what  the  company  actually  , 
pays  on  the  preferential  loan  in  that year.  We  determine 
what  a  company  would  pay· a  normal  commercial  lender  by 
constructing  a  comparable  commercial  locin  at  t.he 
appropriate market  rate  (the  "benchmark").  If the 
preferential  loan  is part of  a  broad,  national  lending 
program,  we  use  a  national  average  commercial  interest 
rate  as  our  benchmark.  If  the  loan  program  is  not 
gen~rally available -- ·like most  large  loans  to  respondent 
steel  companies  -- the  benchmark  used  instead,  where 
available,  is  the  company's  actual  commercial  credit 
experience  (~,  a  contemporaneous  loan  to  the  company - 17  -
from  a  private  commercial  lender).  If  there  were  no 
similar  loans,  the  national  commercial  rate  is  used  as  a 
second-best  alternative. 
*  *  *  *  * 
"After  calculating  the  payment  differential  in 
each  year  of  the  loan,  we  then  calculated  the  present 
value  of  this  stream of  benefits  in  the  year  the  loan  was 
made,  using  a  national  cost  of  long-term  corporate debt  in 
that year  as  the discount  rate.  In  other words,  we 
determine  the  subsidy value  of  a  preferential  loan  as  if 
the  benefits  had  been  bestowed  as  a  lump-sum  grant  in  the 
year  the  loan  was  given.  We  determine  how  much  less 
valuable  money  tomorrow  is  than  money  today  by  applying  a 
discount  rate.  We  are  using  the  national  cost  of 
long-term  corporate debt  for  the  year  in  which  the  loan  -- .. 
was  given  as  this discount  rate.  This  amount  is  then 
allocated  evenly over  the life of  the  loan,  with  one 
exception.  Where  the  loan  was  given  expressly for  the 
purchase  of  a  costly piece  of  capital equipment,  the 
present  value  of  the  payment  differentials  is allocated 
over  the  useful  life of  the  capital  equipment  concerned. 
*  *  *  *  * 
"When  the  company  under  investigation  has  a 
history of  deep or significant  continuing  losses,  and 
diminishing  (if  any)  access  to  private  lenders,  we 
generally  agree  with  petitioners.  In  these  situations, - 18  -
neither  national  nor  company-specific market  interest 
rates proved  an  appropriate  benchmark  since,  by 
definition,  an  uncreditworthy  company  could  not  receive 
loans  on  these  terms  without  government  intervention.  Nor 
have  we  been  able  to  find  any  reasonable  and  practic9l 
basis  for  selecting  a  risk premium  to  be. added  ..  to  a 
national  interest rate  in  order  to establish  an 
appropriate  benchmark  for  companies  considered 
uncreditworthy.  Therefore,  we  have  treated  loans  to  an 
uncreditworthy  company  as  an  equity  infusion  by  the 
government.  We  believe  this  treatment  is  justified by  the 
treat  [sic]  risk,  very  junior status,  and  low  probability 
of  repayment  of  these  loans.  To  the .extent  that  principal 
and/or  interest  is actually paid  on  these  loans,  however, 
the  subsidy  (which  is  calculated  using  our  equity 
methodology,  infra)  is ~€duced dollar  for dollar  in  the  . . 
year of  repayment.  Moreover;  in  no  case  do  w~ 
countervail  a  loan  subsidy to  a  creditwarthy or 
uncreditworthy  company  more  than  if the  government  gave 
the  principal  as  an  outright grant." 
2.  Counterarguments 
a.  Distinction between  creditworthy and 
allegedly uncreditworthy companies. 
This  distinction  is  a  complete  innovation  which 
is  not  provided  for  anywhere  in  the GATT.  Because  the 
GATT  criterion  for  the  determination  of  the  existence  and - 19  -
amount  of  a  subsidy  is  the  financial  contribution  of  the 
government,  the  creditworthiness  of  the  companies 
concerned  is totally irrelevant. 
It is clear  from  the  GATT,  and  especially by 
analogy  to  item  (k)  of  the Subsidies  Code  Illustrat.ive 
List,  that  the  proper test of  a  subsidy  is  a  comparison 
between  the  rate of  interest  charged  to  the  company  and 
the  rate at  which  the  government  borrowed  the  funds.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  the  measure  of  any  subsidy  is  the 
difference  between  the  rate  at  which  the  government 
borrows  and  the  rate  at  which  it lends  to  the  company 
concerned. 
b.  Method  of Determination of 
Creditworthiness 
Even  if the  distinction  between  creditworthy  and 
uncreditworthy  companies  was  a  valid  one,  the  DOC  .- .  -
determination of  creditworthiness  is· based  on  a  totally 
simplistic view  taken  with  the  benefit-of hindsight. 
, 
First,  it ignores  the  fact  that profitability is only  one 
aspect  of  creditworthiness.  Indeed,  depending  on 
circumstances,  it may  not  even  be  a  significant factor  in 
assessing  creditworthiness.  If  the  company's  asset value 
is sufficient,  a  loss-making  company  can still be 
absolutely  creditworthy. 
Second,  even  if profitability were  the  only 
measure  of  creditworthiness,  it would  be  unrealistic to 
expect  any  investor,  whether  private  or  governmental,  to - 20  -
come  to  the  same  conclusion  in making  decisions  as  to its 
investment  policy,  as  an  outsider would  come  to,  years 
later,  with  the  benefit of  hindsight.  There  may  be  a 
point  of  no  return after which  a  company  would  cease  to  be 
creditworthy,  but  this point  is  clearly not  the  first year 
in which  a  company  realizes  a  loss.  It would  ~e necessary 
to  allow a  reasonable grace  period  during  which 
assessments  could  be  made.  An  example  of  this  approach  is 
the  loan guarantee of  $1000  million given  by  the United 
States Government  in  1980  to Chrylser  to  keep  it in 
business  although  the  company  had  been  losing  money  since 
1977  and,  in  fact,  has  continued  to  do  so. 
Furthermore,  to  the  extent  ~hat the  DOC  has  used 
debt/equity ratios to  support  its findings  of 
uncreditworthiness,  it has  followed  __ a  method  of 
calculating  the  debt/eq\fi ty ratio which  is  completely 
- .  . . 
inconsistent with  its  charac~erization of  loans  as 
infusions  of  equity  for  purposes  of  calculating  the 
subsidy.  The  loan  is treated  as  debt  of  the  companies  in 
evaluating  its debt/equity ratio  for  purposes  of 
determining  uncreditworthiness,  but  such  determination 
having  been  made,  the  subsidy value  of  such  loan  is then 
calculated  as  an  infusion of equity  for  purposes  of 
countervailing. - 21  -
C.  Loan  Guarantees 
1.  DOC  Determination 
"A  loan  guarantee  by  the  government  constitutes 
a  subsidy  to the  extent  the guarantee  assures  more 
favorable  loan  terms  than  for  an  unguaranteed  loan.  The 
subsidy  amount  is quantified  in  the  same  manner  as  for  a 
preferential  loan." 
2.  Counterarguments 
The  DOC  determinations  distinguish  incorrectly 
between  creditworthy  and  uncreditworthy  companies.  They 
measure  the  amount  of  the  subsidy  by  comparing  the 
interest rate paid  by  the  firms  with  the  hypothetical 
interest  rate  which  it is  claimed  they  would  have  had  to 
pay  for  an  unguaranteed  loan.  For  alleged~y 
uncreditworthy  firms  the  amount  of  the  loan  was  treated  as 
--
an  equity  infusion. 
It is  clear  from  the GATT,  and  especially by 
analogy  with  item· ( j)  of  the ~subsidies C-ode  Illustrative 
List,  that  the  test of  a  subsidy  in  the  case  of  loan 
guarantees  and,  thus,  the measure  of  any  subsidy,  is 
whether  the  long-term operating  costs of  the 
loan-guarantee  program.are  covered  by  the  fees  charged. 
It follows  from  this  that  no  distinction  should  be  made 
between  creditworthy  and  allegedly  uncreditworthy  firms, 
because  the  reference  to the  long-term operating  costs - 22  -
only makes  sense  if it is  assumed  that  some  of  the 
companies  for  which  loans  are guaranteed  will  subsequently 
prove  not  to  be  creditworthy. 
D.  Regional  Aid 
1.  DOC  Determination 
Regional  aid  programs  are  considered  .. 
countervailable without  taking  into  consideration  any 
disadvantages  incurred  by  companies  having  to operate  in 
economically  retarded  and  remote  areas.  On  the  contrary, 
the  determination  that  such  programs  are  countervailable 
is  expressly justified by  their regional  character  on  the 
dubious  basis  that  otherwise  the  requirement  of United 
States  domestic  law,  that  countervailable  subsidies must 
be  specific to  a  specific  industry or  groups  of 
industries,  would  not  be  met. 
2.  Counterarguments 
This  approach  does not  bake  into  account  that, 
' 
under  GATT  and  the Subsidies  Code~  counterv~ilable 
subsidies  are  only  those  which  adversely  affect  the 
conditions  of  normal  competition.  Article  11(1)  of  the 
Subsidies  Code  states that  signatories  of  the  Code  do  not 
intend  to restrict the  right of  signatories  to  use 
subsidies,  other  than  export  subsidies,  to  achieve  certain 
social  and  economic  policy objectives  which  they  consider 
desirable,  such  as  the ·elimination of  industrial,  economic - 23  -
and  social disadvantages  of  specific regions.  In 
addition,  Article  11(2)  of the Subsidies  Code  states that 
signatories  recognize  that  such  subsidies  may  adversely 
affect the  conditions of  normal  competition.  Therefore, 
signatories  are  committed  to  seek  to  avoid  cau~ing such 
effects  in  drawing  up  their policies. 
Aids  granted  to establish  new  industries or  to 
maintain  existing  industries  in  remote  regions  suffering 
from  industrial,  economic  and  social  disadvantages  enter 
into  the  scope  of  infrastructure  and  social  policy  and  are 
common  practice  throughout  all  industrialized  countries. 
They  are  not  countervailable  subsidies  insofar  as  they do 
. 
not  exceed  the  additional  costs  incurred  by  an  industry 
~ 
situated  in  these distinct regions,  within,the  particular 
country,  as  compared  to  what  would  be  the  cost  in  other 
--
locations offering  a  coocrete  alternative  for  industrial 
settlement. 
-
RESERVATION 
The  Community  reserves  the  right  to  amplify  the 
above  arguments  at  a  later stage,  in particular  i~ the 
lig~t of  the discussions  in  the  GATT  Committee  on 
Subsidies  and  Countervailing Measures. ANNEX  B 
The  assertion  has  been  made  by  DOC  that  the 
Annex  to  the Subsidies Code  merely  contains  illustrations 
of  programs  that  are  export  subsidies  prohibited  under 
Article  9  of  the Code,  and,  therefore  is only  relevant  to 
proceedings  under Part VI  of  the  Code,  before  the 
Committee  on  Subsidies  and  Countervailing Measures.  In  -
response  to  this  assertion,  the  Community  is  compelled  to 
assert  the  obvious.  The  Code  is  a  single  document  which 
must  be  read  in  its entirety. 
Part  I  of  the  Code  contains  rules  governing  the 
procedures  for  imposition  of  countervailirig duties  by 
. 
investigating  authorities.  Part II contains  substantive 
- rules  relating  to  the  definition of  subsidy  and  to  , 
signatory government  obligations  with  respect  to  programs 
benefitting  their domestic  ..  industries.  Part VI  contains 
the  dispute  settlement  procedur~s_'for  reso~uti.on of  issues 
arising  under  all-these rules.  None  of  the.se  parts  can  be 
read  independently of  the  other parts of  the  Code. 
For  example,  the  procedural  rules  in Part  I 
refer  to all  forms  of  subsidy,  including  export  su~sidies 
pro~ibited under Article  9  and  illustrated  in  the Annex. 
Article  5,  paragraph  9,  of Part  I  explicitly makes 
retroactive  imposition of  countervailing duties  contingent 
on  the  existence of  export  subsidies  prohibited  under 
Article  9  of Part II. - 2  -
Because  of  the  text  and  the  organization of  the  Code,  and 
as  a  matter  of  logical  policy,  the Community  stresses  that 
parts  I  and  II of  the  Code  must  be  read  together  as  part 
of  a  single  body  of  rules. 
The  assertion  has  also  been  made  that  the  Annex, 
assuming  that it is  relevant  to  the  definition-of  a 
subsidy  for  purposes  of  countervailing duties,-is merely 
illustrative.  Clearly,  the  Annex  contains  a  partial list 
of  programs  which,  under  the  conditions  prescribed  in  the 
Annex,  are  export  subsidies.  The  Annex  is  illustrative· 
only  in  the  sense  that  programs  not  described  in  the list 
may  also  be  export  subsidies. 
It was  not  the  intention of. the  negotiators  of 
the  Code  that  the  application of  the  rules  in  the  Annex  be 
left to  the  discretion of  signatory_~overnments.  If a 
program  is described  in·the Annex,  then  the  rules  in  the 
Annex  must  apply  for  all purposes  of  th~ Code. 
, 
It follqws  from  this  that  if a'program  is  one 
described  in  the Annex,  but  the  operation of  that  program 
does  not  meet  the  conditions prescribed  in  the  Annex  for 
that  program  to  be  a  subsidy,  then  that  program  is not  a 
subs_idy  for  purposes of  the  Code.  For  example,  item  (g) 
of  the Annex  provides  that  exemption  or  remission  of 
indirect  taxes  upon  exportation  in  excess  of  such  taxes 
actually levied  is  a  subsidy.  Clearly,  then,  exemption  or - 3  -
remission of  indirect  taxes  that  is  not  in excess  of  the 
amount  levied  is not  a  subsidy.  Item  (k)  provides  that 
government  loans  at  rates  below  those  that government  pays 
to  borrow money  are  subsidies.  Therefore,  government 
loans  at or  above  the  rate at  which  the  government 
borrowed  funds  do  not  constitute  a  subsidy.  -
In  instances  where  a  program  is  not an export 
subsidy within  the  meaning  of  the  Code  but  has  a  structure 
closely related  to programs  described  in  the  Annex,  common 
sense  requires  application of  the  rules  in  the  Annex  to 
such  programs  by  analogy.  If this  approach  is  not 
followed,  the  absurd  result would  be  that  a  program  could 
. 
be  considered  to  be  a  subsidy within .the  meaning  of  the 
- Code,  if it was  a  domestic  program,  but  would  not  be  a  , 
subsidy,  if it was  an  export  progra~.  To  apply more 
.  . 
rigorous  standards  to domestic  programs  than  to  export 
programs  is clearly  contrary~  to  the  Code  and  to  the GATT. 